A series of 19 hypervelocity impact tests have been performed on ISS-representative structure walls to evaluate the effect on micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) protective capability caused by replacing honeycomb sandwich panel cores with metallic open-cell foam. In the experiments, secondary impacts on individual foam ligaments were found to raise the thermal state of projectile and bumper fragments, inducing break-up and melt at lower impact velocities than the baseline honeycomb configuration. A ballistic limit equation is derived for the foam-modified configuration, and in comparison with the honeycomb baseline a performance increase of 3-15% at normal incidence was predicted. With increasin g impact obliquity, the enhancement in protective capability provided by the modification is predicted to further increase. The reduction in penetration and failure risk posed by MMOD impacts is achieved by the foam-modified configuration without a significant decrease in mechanical or thermal performance, and with no additional weight. As such, it is considered a promising upgrade to MMOD shielding on ISS modules which incorporate honeycomb sandwich panels and are yet to fly.
INTRODUCTION
The performance of a dual-wall protective spacecraft structure against the impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles is generally considered to be degraded by the presence of a honeycomb core. For impacts which penetrate the shield outer wall (bumper or front facesheet), projectile and bumper fragments disperse radially as they propagate through the shield interior, distributing the load over an area of the shield rear wall significantly larger than that of the original projectile diameter. The presence of honeycomb cell walls acts to restrict expansion, effectively channeling the fragments within a limited number of honeycomb cells for a more concentrated impact upon the rear facesheet. However, mission requirements often prevent the inclusion of a dedicated MMOD shielding structure, and as such, structural panels (i.e. honeycomb sandwich panels) also commonly serve as the protective system. Metallic foams are a promising alternative to honeycomb structures as they offer comparable structural and thermal performance without the presence of MMOD shielding-detrimental channeling cells. In this paper, modifications to a double-layer honeycomb sandwich panel shielding configuration representative of those used onboard the International Space Station (ISS) are evaluated. The modifications entail the substitution of aluminum honeycomb for aluminum open-cell foams, while the total shield weight in maintained.
BACKGROUND

Honeycomb sandwich panels
Given their conunon application in space vehicle primary structures, the performance of honeycomb wider impact of MMOD particles at hypervelocity has been investigated in a multitude of studies. Jex et al. [1] and Sibeaud et al. [2] discussed that the presence of a honeycomb core enhanced the shielding performance of a dual-wall structure at hypervelocity. They concluded that secondary impacts between ejecta fragments and cell walls overcompensated for the detrimental effect of channeling. A more commonly held view is that the presence of a honeycomb core is unfavorable to the shielding performance. Taylor et al. [3] quantified the degradation in performance through inclusion of a scaling factor which acts to reduce the effective rear facesheet thickness by 50% in definition of the panel https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090016347 2019-07-05T11:11:31+00:00Z ballistic limit at hypen-elocities (i.e. molten and/or vaporized ejecta). Ryan et al. [4] defined a degradation in shielding performance due to the presence of a honeycomb core equal to a --46% reduction in shielding capability at normal impact, reducing with increasing obliquity (e.g. for impact at 60°, the degradation in performance drops to --18%). Sennett and Lathrop [5] also quantified the effect of the honeycomb core, stating that once the panel thickness increases above two times the honeycomb cell size, no increase in shielding capability is achieved with an increase in shield thickness when fragments were either molten or vaporized. For solid fragment ejecta, the effect was not nearly as severe. In Fig. 1 , a comparison between the perfornance at 7 km/s (normal impact) predicted for a dual-wall shield with and without a honeycomb core. For the Whipple shield configuration (i.e. no honeycomb core), the new non optimum (NNO) equation [6] is used. It should be noted that the NNO equation (and hence, the Taylor and Sennett & Lathrop approaches) may provide non-conservative predictions for projectile diameter to shield spacing ratios (S/d t,) < 15. [8] against that of aluminum honeycomb core sandwich panels (Al HC SP). In Fig. 2 a comparison between damages induced by nominally identical impacts are shown. It should be noted that the facesheets of the HC SP were significantly thicker than those of the foam panel in order to provide comparable areal densities. In the figure, the foam core is shown to restrict fra gment radial expansion to an equal or greater degree than the HC_ However, while fragments are expected to be channeled within the HC cells, the foam homogeneity should ensure that resistance to fra gment cloud expansion is equal in all directions, therefore limiting the degree of channeling. For these impact conditions, the performance of the foam panel is shown to be clearly superior to that of the honeycomb panel.
TARGET DEFINITION
Double-laver honeycomb (DL-H)
The baseline tar get is constructed of two honeycomb sandwich panels, with two outer layers of stainless steel mesh and a monolithic aluminum rear wall, shown in Fig. 3 . Details of the target components are provided in Table 1 . The total areal density of the DL-H configuration is 1.57 g/=7^. ii 
Double-laver foam (DL-F)
In the DL-F configuration, the two honeycomb sandwich panels are replaced with 12.7 iron thick open-cell A16101-T6 foam panels. As the areal weight of the foam core (6-8% relative density) is greater than the honeycomb (--4.8%), facesheets are only installed on the first foam panel. The foam has a pore density of 10 per linear inch (PPI), details of which are given in Fig. 4 . A schematic of the DL-F target is shown in Fig. 5 , with details of target components provided in Table 2 . The total areal density of the DL-F configuration is 1.68 g/cm2. Table 3 . Impact test results.
In order to evaluate the effect of interchanging aluminum honeycomb for open-cell aluminum foam, a direct comparison can be made between impact damages induced on both configurations at nominally-identical impact conditions. In Fig. 6 damages induced in the DL-H and DL-F targets by the impact of 0.833 cm diameter projectiles at 6.83±0.09 kin/s with normal incidence are compared. Damage in the two mesh layers, and the entry hole on the I" sandwich panel are similar for both configurations. The diameter of rear facesheet material peeled back from the I` sandwich panel exit hole is also similar: however the extension of core damage is noticeably less in the foam. The through hole in the 2 nd panels is shown to be significantly larger for the DL-H confi guration than the DL-F shield (88x90 nun vs. 70x62 min), indicating that the debris cloud is more finely concentrated by the foam sandwich panel bumper than the honeycomb sandwich panel. The diameter of the through hole in the 2 nd panels is similar to that of the core damage in the first sandwich panel for both configurations (--91 vs. 84 1nm for DL-H; --58 vs. _ 66 nun for DL-F). This suggests that the facesheets on the 2 "d panel of the DL-H configuration have little effect on the expansion of the debris cloud (i.e. they have minimal re-focusing effect).
The rear wall of the DL-H configuration is perforated, showing a large through crack (80 mm in length; 5 inln wide) and multiple individual craters. Given the appearance of the through crack, it is expected that failure of the rear wall occurred through penetration of individual solid fragments which acted as crack initiation sites that were propagated during the impulsive load of the fragment cloud. The rear wall of the DL-F confi guration is significantly deformed, yet there is no perforation or detachment of spalled material from the rear surface. The majority of deposits on the rear wall are from molten aluminum, visible as the bright silver coating in the target photograph. The rear wall shows some cratering from impact of individual solid fragments, which form small dimples on the rear side of the panel. Under these impact conditions, the performance of the DL-F shield is clearly superior to that of the baseline DL-H shield.
Evaluation of shield performance
The effect of secondary projectile and bumper fragment impacts upon individual foam cell ligaments is expected to lead to increased fragmentation, melting and vaporization at lower velocities than for conventional shielding configurations (e.g. Whipple shield, honeycomb sandwich panel). This mechanism is utilized in the multi-shock shield, which was shown in [9] [10] to provide damage features at 6.3 km/s representative of those seen at 10 km/s on single bumper shields. An approximation of effective impact velocities can be made from projectile entropy (or internal ener gy). In [11] Swift calculates required impact velocities for melt and vaporization conditions based on the concept of entropy trapping -in which the entropy injected into projectile and target materials can be calculated from the Hugoniot and release isentrope. The increase in entropy acts to raise the material internal energy (or temperature); eventually reaching and exceedin g the material fusion energy (melting) and vaporization energy.
The rear walls of the DL-H target in Fig. 6 shows a degree of molten aluminum deposits, although the predominant damage feature is cratering about the central damage zone. Alternatively, the DL-F target shows significant molten aluminum over a large central area with only a small number of finite craters. Clearly, therefore, secondary impacts on the foam ligaments are effective in raising fragment entropy. 
BALLISTIC LEVIIT EQUATIONS
To evaluate the effect of the shielding modifications over the complete range of expected in-orbit impact conditions, ballistic limit curves can be used. Calculated using empirical ballistic limit equations (BLEs), these curves demarcate between impact conditions leading to pass or fail, and are used in modern risk assessment codes such as NASA's BUMPER-II to determine mission risk to micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD).
The DL-H configuration is representative of the entranced zone 11 shield onboard the FGB module of the ISS (Zarya) [12] . For FGB shielding, a generic ballistic limit equation was defined based on the NNO Whipple shield equation [6] . In order to adjust the equation to suit the double-layer honeycomb configuration, the bumper thickness was estimated using the areal density of the I" honeycomb sandwich panel, and half the areal density of the 2"`1 sandwich panel. The remaining 50% of the 2'd sandwich panel areal density was added to the thickness of the shield rear wall, and the equation constants were empirically adjusted from test data. The enhanced zone 11 FGB ballistic limit equation is defined (from [ 12] ) as: The diameter of the steel wire used in the enhanced zone 11 shield was 0.280 nun, less than that of the DL-H configuration tested in this study (0.4064 nun). As such, the ballistic limit equation constants must be adjusted in order to fit the test data reported in Table  3 . The low and high velocity coefficients, C L and CH respectively, are y calculated based on the areal densities of the individual shield components: For the DL-F configuration, the areal densities of the specific shield components are also included in the equation fit coefficients. For honeycomb sandwich panels, the mass of the core is generally ignored in determining effective shield thicknesses (i.e. treated as non-ballistic mass). For foam core sandwich panels, however, the foam is an active shielding component. The ballistic limit equation for the DL-F configuration is defined as:
High velocity: when V >_ V H/cos 0, 
Low velocity: when V:5 VL/cos 0,
where a -LV angle dependence coefficient (-) = 1.75
C = 3(t., +(2AD..h + ADsPI + ADSP, )/2.8)
In Fig. 7 the ballistic limit curve of the modified DL-F shield is plotted a gainst the baseline DL-H configuration. For normal impact, the modifications result in a small predicted improvement over the range of applicable impact velocities. At 3 km/s the DL-F target provides a 15% improvement in critical projectile diameter; while at 7 km/s a 3% increase is predicted. The larger low velocity sizing constant (CL) leads to increasing performance gain with increasing impact obliquity, although there is a lack of test data to support or disprove this extrapolation. In [14] , the velocity regime transition limits of a ballistic limit equation for the foam bumper shielding configuration were set at 2.7 and 6.5 km's respectively, in recognition of the increased fragmentation and melting provided by the structure (compared to a traditional Whipple shield). However, due to the evidence of individual solid fragment impacts upon the shield rear wall for impact velocities up to 6.76 km/s in this study, and in the absence of additional test data providing clear experimental justification; the transition velocities defined in [6] for aluminum Whipple shields and in [12] for the DL-H confi guration are maintained in the ballistic limit equation derived for the DL-F shield.
Enhanced fragmentation and melting induced by the foam microstructure was found in [13] to be ineffective against projectiles in the cm-sized range at normal incidence; and nun-sized projectiles at oblique angles. The authors concluded that secondary impacts were no longer able to induce fragmentation and melting of the entire projectile at these impact 
CONCLUSIONS AND StWIMARY
In this paper, the effect on shielding performance achieved by replacing metallic honeycomb cores for metallic open-cell foam cores in a double sandwich panel MMOD shielding confi guration representative of those used onboard the ISS was assessed. A baseline double-layer honeycomb (DL-H), and modified double-layer foam (DL-F) configuration were subject to impact by projectiles at hypervelocity, from which ballistic limit equations were derived. These equations were based on the NNO IN'hipple shield [6] and general FGB [12] equations, and included fit coefficients based on areal densities of individual shielding components. At normal incidence the foam-modified shield was found to provide a 15% improvement in critical projectile diameter at low velocity (i.e. 3 km/s) and a 3% increase at high velocity (7 km/s). With increasing impact obliquity the foam shield performance enhancement increases at the lowshatter regime transition velocity, up to a 29% improvement in critical diameter at 60°. It should be noted that the double-layer honeycomb equation constants are defined for consistency with the enhanced zone 11 shield described in [12] , for which there is no low velocity test data.
The presence of honeycomb cells is considered to be detrimental to the shielding performance of a dualwall configuration due to thecell walls acting to restrict the expansion of projectile and bumper (or front facesheet) fra gments -referred to as channeling. However, the thickness of the honeycomb sandwich panels in the double-layer configuration are less than twice the diameter of even the smallest projectile used in the testing. Thus, dispersion of the projectile and bumper fra gments is expected to be uninterrupted prior to impact upon the sandwich panel rear facesheet. As such, the performance enhancement gained by replacing the honeycomb core with open-cell foams is not expected to result as a simple absence of through-thickness channeling cells. Rather, secondary impacts of projectile and bumper fragments upon individual foam cell ligaments induced repeated shocks, increasing fragment entropy and subsequently reducing Vfailure strengths. Evidence of increased projectile fragmentation and melting was shown for the double-layer foam configuration (compared to the double-layer honeycomb configuration). Previous investigations on metallic open-cell foam bumpers have noted a decrease in performance for oblique impact, and normal impact of large cm-sized projectile due to an inability of the repeated shocking procedure to fragment the entire projectile at these conditions. However, the presence of the double mesh outer layers breaks up the projectile prior to impact upon the I't sandwich panel front facesheet, ensuring the propagation of smaller, more manageable impactors within the foam core.
